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Abstract 
 
 This study examines the contribution of a personality variable in motivation losses in 
group performance. Differences in the endorsement of the ‘Protestant Work Ethic’ can 
account for variance in motivation losses in group work. Male student scores on the Mirels-
Garrett Protestant Work Ethic Scale and Ho’s Australian Work Ethic Scale as well as 
different preferences for reward distributions were used as moderator variables. The study 
tested motivation losses in a situation that was designed to provoke the free-rider effect and in 
a situation that was designed to provoke the sucker-effect. Results showed that different facets 
of the Protestant Work Ethic have different effects on behavior in group work situations: 
Whereas approval of the equity principle moderates the sucker-effect, belief in work as a 
value moderates the free-rider effect. 
 
Key-words: ‘Group-productivity’, ‘motivation-losses’, ‘Protestant Work Ethic’ 
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Nowadays a lot of important tasks in life cannot be conducted by a single individual, 
but can only be accomplished by groups. For instance, in industrial organizations the 
formation of groups, whose members pool their individual contribution to a common group 
product has been an important issue since a long time (e.g. Antoni, 1994). The result of the 
teamwork does not always work out as intended. In some instances organizational managers 
find the group product satisfying, in other instances however the group is far from achieving 
their productive potential. 
The phenomenon of diminished actual group productivity compared to potential 
group productivity has been thoroughly investigated and is a well established finding. Of 
course, decreased productivity can be the result of coordination-losses, but it is also a result of 
effort-reduction stemming from motivation-losses (Steiner, 1972; Latane, Williams, & 
Harkins, 1979). One proposed reason for motivation losses is that individuals might realize 
that their contribution cannot be identified and thus evaluated (Harkins & Jackson, 1985). 
Furthermore, group-members may perceive their contributions as dispensable and hence 
reduce their effort while free-riding on the contribution of the others (Kerr & Bruun, 1983). 
These explanations assume that the basic motivation of each individual cannot consist in 
working per se or maximizing a group utility. It is rather assumed that the basic motivation of 
each individual consists in maximizing individual utility, hence maximizing the individual 
input-output ratio, an assumption underlying neoclassical economics. 
Group-work can be viewed as a social dilemma (Kerr, 1983) inasmuch as the strategy 
‘not to contribute to the group product’ dominates the strategy ‘to contribute’, no matter what 
the other group-members are doing; however if no-one contributes the collective is worse off 
as the group does not produce. In other words, group-members have an incentive to defect, as 
long as their contributions are additive, and the individual’s main aim is to achieve a maximal 
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individual outcome. But pursuing that strategy is not conducive to the group productivity, and 
hence in conflict with the collective interest. 
It is undeniable that the products of groups have an enormous significance in our lives. 
Whereas in the past, at times of the manufacturing industry, the pooling of physical effort was 
important, it is nowadays, at times of the knowledge and service industry, the joint effort we 
exert on cognitive tasks. Think of writing a joint report, developing a commercial computer 
program, or operating an air traffic control system. But we are not only facing today the times 
of knowledge and service industry, but also globalization, a faster moving society and change 
of traditional values. Values like modesty, diligence, honesty have the taste of being old-
fashioned, while self-actualization, pursuing a career and cultivating a healthy narcissism are 
on the agenda (e.g. Hogan & Blake, 1996). If the spirit of the 22nd century is dominated by 
pursuing one’s own individual goals, and on the other hand, team work is important, then an 
issue is who does the team work effectively. Who would not leave us in the lurch when 
working jointly? In the current research, we address the issue, whether all individuals are 
equally inclined to loaf on other team members, or whether there is a way to tell team workers 
from team loafers systematically apart. After all, when team work is so important, a way to 
identify those who still exert effort in groups, can become important for all of us. But before 
we turn to the question what incentives people have for contributing to a group-product, we 
will briefly summarize the social psychological explanations for reduced group productivity. 
Motivation losses in group work 
Since the discovery of the Ringelmann effect (see Moede, 1927, see also Kravitz & 
Martin, 1986) and its psychological analysis (Ingham, Levinger, Graves & Peckham, 1974), 
we know that group work compared to individual work often results in productivity losses. 
Latane, Williams & Harkins (1979) showed that the decreased productivity is caused by co-
ordination loss and, what is more important from a psychological perspective, by effort 
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reduction. They interpreted the effort reduction as a result of motivation losses and called it 
‘social loafing’. With emerging research the phenomenon of motivation losses in groups has 
been given different labels depending on the circumstantial conditions. Social loafing stems 
from the realization that the individual contribution cannot be identified and thus evaluated 
(Harkins & Jackson, 1985). The potential for evaluation need not necessarily refer to an 
external person, like e.g. the experimenter, a possible self-evaluation can eliminate the effect 
as well as a possible comparison to a social group standard (Szymanski & Harkins, 1987; 
Harkins & Szymanski, 1989). Free-riding stems from the perception that the individual's 
contribution is dispensable, even if it is identifiable and appraisable (Kerr & Brunn, 1983, see 
also for a detailed analysis of task type and possible motivation losses in the framework of 
social dilemmas Arnscheid, Diehl & Stroebe, 1997). The sucker-effect results from the 
perception that others could free-ride on the individual’s expenses (Orbell & Dawes, 1981). In 
this case it is the potential of the averseness of this role, which makes the individual reduce 
his/her effort. Kerr (1983) argues that the violation of certain social norms like the equity 
norm, the norm of reciprocity and the norm of social responsibility make the sucker role 
uncomfortable. In the last decade motivation losses in group performance have been linked to 
general theories of motivation (Karau & Williams, 1993; Shepperd & Taylor, 1999; 
Shepperd, 1993). 
The assumed underlying mechanism for the free-rider effect and social loafing make 
the assumption that individual’s main driving force is to maximize individual outcomes, while 
minimizing input. The proposed underlying mechanism for the sucker-effect is in that sense 
distinct from the other two, as it makes the assumption that behavior can also be driven by 
other motives and needs like feeling socially equal and accepted. An obvious question is then, 
whether other motives, as for instance, seeing work as something valuable per se, may play 
important roles in group work, too.  
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What Moderates Motivation Losses in Group Work 
Karau’s and Williams’ (1993) meta-analytic review testifies that motivation losses in 
group work is a robust phenomenon, which generalizes across tasks and populations. Above 
we have briefly mentioned variables that play a role in the underlying processes of motivation 
losses in groups. Among those, evaluation potential, expectations of co-worker performance, 
task meaningfulness, and culture were found to have a consistent impact (Karau & Williams, 
1993).  
Moreover, individual differences have also been shown to moderate motivation losses 
in groups. Need for cognition refers to the tendency to engage and enjoy effortful cognitive 
endeavors (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). Smith, Kerr, Markus, and Stasson (2001) demonstrated 
that the need for cognition can moderate motivation losses in group work:  Individuals high in 
need for cognition worked equally hard on a vigilance task, no matter whether they were 
working collectively or coactively. Individuals low in need for cognition, however, exerted 
considerable less effort when working collective compared to working coactive.   
Hart, Karau, Stasson and Kerr (2004) showed that people high in achievement 
motivation exerted equal effort, regardless of whether they were working coactively or 
collectively, and whether they expected the other person to exert high or low effort. However, 
people low in achievement motivation reduced their effort most when working collectively 
with somebody from whom they expected high effort. Hence, apparently they reduced their 
effort when they perceived their contribution as dispensable and not identifiable.  What seems 
to be left open in their study is what reason participants attributed to the allegedly predicted 
effort of their team-member. When induced to expect low effort, participants received the 
message that their team partner found the task very interesting but was not going to exert 
much effort on it. This message could be interpreted a bit ambiguous and neither is an 
attribution on the partner’s willingness or capability compelling. Another issue is that people 
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do not only have the trait of achievement motivation. They might have other traits that could 
be systematically associated with achievement motivation or need for cognition, and which 
also have an impact on behavior in teams, like for instance attitude towards work and 
endowment of an equity principle. 
 
The Protestant Work Ethic 
In 1905 Max Weber published his work ‘The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism’. The basic idea of this work was that the Protestant ethic was an important factor 
in the economic success of Protestant groups in the early stages of capitalism. Worldly 
success was interpreted as a sign of election and therefore vigorously pursued. 
After Weber, anthropologists, economists, sociologists, historians and psychologists have 
been interested in the issue of the Protestant Work Ethic (PWE). Psychologists were not 
concerned with whether Weber was right or wrong, but with translating the concept into 
individual terms. 
In the discipline of psychology, McClelland (1961) was the first to use the concept of 
PWE. His explanation for the association between Protestantism and capitalism was the 
following: Parents, who internalized Protestant values, tend to perform child rearing practices, 
which foster independence, rationality and delay of gratification. This in turn is likely to lead 
to children with a high achievement motivation, and people with a high achievement 
motivation are very likely to contribute to expansion of business. He subsumed the concept 
Protestant Work Ethic into the need for achievement concept, which has been criticized, since 
he concentrated on only the ‘hard work-aspect’ of the work ethic and left out other aspects. 
But the idea that high achievement motivation is a relative stable disposition, which has its 
roots in the early socialization in the Protestant Work Ethic led others to operationalize PWE 
beliefs as a variable of individual differences. The research focus has shifted from the 
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etiology of the PWE to the measurement of this variable and on relationships between the 
PWE and behavior-patterns and other belief systems. Self-report measures have been 
developed (e.g. Goldstein & Eichhorn, 1961; Blood, 1969; Mirels & Garrett, 1971; Hammond 
& Williams, 1976; Buchholz, 1976; Ray, 1982; Ho, 1984). In respect to the association of the 
PWE with behaviors and other constructs, key-findings are: Persons with a high PWE are 
industrious, ambitious, hard working and intrinsically motivated (Furnham, 1990a); they tend 
to have an internal locus of control in matters that are linked to work (Lied & Pritchard, 
1976); they are not easily affected by external factors and their behavioral orientation in a 
free-choice period is to work equally hard on the task regardless of the performance feedback 
(Furnham, 1990a). Moreover, they are inclined to apply the equity norm to a reward 
distribution (Greenberg,1978). 
Equity norm refers to a proportional input-output relation. People perceive a 
distribution as fair, when their own ratio of inputs to outputs equals the input-output ratio of 
others. Put differently, according to equity norm, rewards should be distributed in direct 
proportion to the effort each group-member exerts (Adams, 1965; Walster, Berscheid & 
Walster 1973). In contrast to that, the equality norm does not focus on the input-output 
relation in determining whether justice or injustice is perceived, but merely on an equal size 
of the output. Hence, the equality norm would suggest an equal distribution of rewards 
irrespective of inputs (Homans, 1958, 1961). 
People low in Protestant Work Ethic are basically the opposite: they are not hard 
working, easily distracted and extrinsically oriented (Furnham, 1990a). They have an external 
locus of control in work-domains and they are easily affected by fear of failure and external 
factors. Moreover, low Protestant Work Ethics will only exert effort on a task when they are 
given negative feedback to avoid failure or embarrassment. They are also more likely to apply 
the equality norm than the equity norm (Greenberg, 1978). 
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Protestant Work Ethics as a Team 
We have outlined that motivation-losses in group-work are determined by external 
factors. This raises the question whether people with intrinsic motives lose motivation when 
working in groups, too. In other words, since PWE is characterized by internal values and 
intrinsic motivation, should it not moderate motivation-losses due to external factors? 
The purpose of the current study is to investigate the PWE as a moderator of 
motivation losses in group work. Heaven (1989) as well as Furnham (1990b) delivered 
empirical evidence that the global construct ‘PWE’ consists of several components. Thus 
different components might be responsible for the behavioral correlates and associations with 
other personality constructs, which were described above. Let us recall some of what we 
mentioned there: high work ethic is associated with a preference for the equity norm and 
intrinsic motivation; whereas people with low work ethic are extrinsically motivated and 
prefer the equality norm when asked to divide a reward (Greenberg, 1978, Furnham, 1990a). 
In PWE measures both of these components are allegedly captured.  
Furthermore, both of these components, the preference for an equity norm and the 
attitude towards work become relevant in group-work situations. Let us see how: The free-
riding effect occurs, when individuals realize that their contribution to the group-product is 
dispensable while they can nevertheless benefit from the group-product. Thus concerning the 
free-rider effect maximizing the individual cost-benefit ratio should lead to less effort. On the 
one hand for people with a high PWE, as they have internalized work as a value itself, high 
performance should have a high value regardless of the outcome. On the other hand for 
people with a low PWE, who see work as a means to an end, performance should depend on 
the value of the outcome. When individual contributions are perceived as dispensable, the 
contingency between individual performance and group performance is diminished. In that 
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way the perceived instrumentality of the behavior to obtain the desired group outcome and the 
individual share of the outcome is reduced. Persons, who see work as a means to an end, 
should be influenced by such a diminished contingency, and therefore they should choose a 
lower effort level. Persons who value work in itself should not be influenced in the choice of 
their effort-level in that specific situation. Therefore participants with a high PWE should not 
show the free-rider effect, whereas participants with a low PWE should show the free-rider 
effect. 
The sucker-effect occurs when individuals perceive the danger that others may free-
ride on their contributions. Thus a perceived violation of the equity norm is responsible for 
this motivation-loss. In group work situations the reward system is usually fixed according to 
the equality principle. Thus, once group-members perceive the danger that others might free-
ride the only possibility to assure that the equity norm is not violated is to reduce the 
contribution. Persons with a high PWE hold the equity norm in high esteem. Therefore they 
should show the sucker-effect to a higher extent than persons with a low PWE. However, if 
intrinsic motivation prevails, persons with high work ethic should show the sucker effect to a 
lesser extent. Thus concerning the sucker-effect contrasting predictions can be derived from 
the concept of PWE. Understanding the relationship between PWE and susceptibility to the 
sucker effect requires that the components of PWE (namely, intrinsic motivation and 
preference for equity norm) be measured separately. 
 
Hypotheses 
Free-riding should not occur within participants with high PWE, while the effect 
should be observed within participants with low PWE. 
Two countervailing hypotheses concerning the relationship between PWE and the 
sucker effect are considered.  First, if adherence to equity norm drives the sucker effect, then 
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high PWE’s should exhibit the sucker effect and low PWE’s should not.  However, if intrinsic 
motivation overrides concern about being the sucker, the reverse should occur:  low PWE’s 
should exhibit the sucker effect and high PWE’s should not.  
 
Method 
Overview.  In order to test the research hypotheses, a situation was designed that 
permitted free-riding, and another situation was designed that made participants vulnerable to 
the sucker-effect.  Also included were two corresponding control conditions. Participants 
worked in dyads on a potentially divisible task.  
In the free-rider condition, participants were led to believe that their partner was 
capable at the task by the initial feedback on the task performance.  In the free-rider control 
condition, participants performed the task individually. 
In the sucker-effect condition, the partner of the participant is portrayed as capable by 
the initial feedback on task performance. The feedback after the first three trials revealed that 
the team did quite well on the task, but that the participant’s contribution consistently 
exceeded the ‘partner’s’ contribution. The ‘partner’ of the participant was a confederate of the 
experimenter. In order to have the participants really attribute the ‘partner’s’ smaller 
contribution to his reduced effort and not to his lower ability of the person, the confederate 
displayed boredom by scripted behavior.  In the sucker-effect control condition, the 
participant’s contribution exceeded the ‘partner’s’ contribution. But here the participant was 
led to believe by the initial task performance feedback that their partner's task ability was low. 
During the initial trials, the confederate commented on the difficulty of the task. 
 
Participants and Design. Eighty male students from University College London 
participated in the experiment. Because of the sex-difference in the sucker-effect (Kerr, 1983) 
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only the male gender was included. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the 4 
experimental conditions (free-rider, free-rider control, sucker-effect or sucker-effect control).  
Thus, the design was a 4 independent groups design.  
 
Measurement of the Protestant Work Ethic The endorsement of the PWE was assessed 
with the Protestant Work Ethic Scale from Mirels & Garrett (1971) and the Australian Work 
Ethic Scale from Ho (1984). Despite the theoretical inclusion of the equity/equality norm in 
the concept of PWE as a variable of individual differences, these scales do not include items 
that measure directly for a preference for equity or equality. Therefore nine further items were 
created to assess whether participants prefer the equality-norm or the equity-norm. Examples 
for such items would be: “The trouble with giving people equal rewards for work is that they 
very rarely work equally hard” or “When a task is completed by a team there is nothing 
wrong with distributing the reward equally regardless of unequal input”. 
Task. The task that the participants were performing in three trials was the ‘d2’ 
concentration test (Brickenkamp, 1994). In this test, participants are confronted with a sheet 
full of the letters ‘d’ and ‘p’ which have one to four lines above or beneath them. The task is 
to work through the lines of letters and cross out every ‘d’ that has two lines with it. In order 
to give a reason, why this task had to be completed by teams, as well as avoiding participants 
from focusing on the real issue of the study the following cover story was presented: 
The study was about how to design the task of manually checking transfer slips most 
efficiently. In most instances one fills in forms nowadays using the computer. However, some 
service providers, like banks, are still obliged to offer other possibilities for clients to hand in 
forms. Service providers let clients also use forms, which can be filled in by hand, but can 
later be read by a computer. People are instructed how to fill in these forms, so that the 
computer can read them, but still a given percentage cannot be read by the computers. When 
The Protestant Work Ethic and Group Performance 
 
12
the computers read the forms, the information is translated into a code. This code then appears 
on a screen, and consists of signs and abnormalities. The signs represent information from the 
transfer slip that could be read properly, whereas the abnormalities stem from information that 
could not be read properly. Somebody has to detect the abnormalities, which demands a 
continuously high concentration and is a boring task. A short period of inattention will lead to 
a greater amount of undetected abnormalities, which will be noticed in the succeeding 
processing. The study wants to test whether sharing the task so that the code would come up 
on two screens has an impact. Another feature that the study was interested in was whether 
and in how far feedback and certain feedback frequencies had an impact on performance. 
Hence, participants would be working on a task, where they had to detect abnormal signs in a 
list of abnormal and normal signs, they were doing this either with another person or alone, 
and would be given feedback in certain frequencies.  
Procedure. After arrival participants were asked to complete the PWE questionnaires, 
which were said to be part of a different research project. They were then told the alleged 
purpose of the study, before they were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions. With 
the exception of the free-rider control condition participants were told that they would work at 
the task as a co-operative team, which meant that their performances were going to be joined 
and that they would be rewarded for their joined performance regardless of the contribution of 
the parties. Participants were guaranteed two pounds as a reward and they were told that they 
could earn up to three pounds depending on their combined performance. Three pounds were 
approximately worth 5 US$. Eventually everybody was paid three pounds. Participants were 
then made familiar with the requirements of the task by practicing on a line of letters. During 
the actual experimental trials participants were wearing headphones. The command to start 
was given via these headphones. Furthermore, during the trials office-noise was displayed in 
order to prevent the participants from overhearing each other’s speed.  
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The first trial lasted for one minute and participants were told that this trial was meant 
to assess their initial ability, the second to the fourth trial went on for two and a half minutes 
each. The experimenter left the room for the time the ‘teams’ were actually working on the 
task. Occurrences in the room could be monitored through a glass window in the door. After 
each trial the experimenter returned, took the sheets from the participants and allegedly 
appraised them in the same room.  
Participants were told that there existed a norm, and their feedback would refer to the 
average of this norm. In all experimental conditions participants were given the feedback after 
the first trial that their own performance, which was supposedly the initial ability, was 20% 
above average. In the sucker-effect condition and the free-rider condition they were told that 
their partner’s performance was 20% above average as well, whereas in the control condition 
to the sucker-effect the performance feedback for the partner was 5% below average.  
After the first trial, in the sucker-effect condition, the confederate yawned and 
stretched and started to lean back with his chair while the sheets were corrected. After the 
second trial he again leaned backwards and began to drum with his fingers on the table. The 
performance feedback then revealed a combined result around 20% above average and a 
contribution of the participant to the total about 60%. After the third trial the confederate 
mumbled to himself “it’s getting boring”, while the experimenter was still outside the room. 
The performance feedback for this trial then again revealed a combined result that was 20% 
above average, to which the participant had contributed again more than 60%. 
In the sucker-effect control condition the confederate said after the first trial ‘I can’t 
tell them apart’. After the second trial he moaned and said to himself “it is really difficult”. 
The combined result was said to be 20% above average and the contribution of the participant 
about 60%. After the third trial the confederate said ‘not easy’ while handing his sheet over to 
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the experimenter. Feedback for this trial then revealed the same result than for the second 
trial. 
In the free-rider condition participants were told after the second and third trial that 
they together achieved 20% above average; no information was given concerning the 
individual contributions to the team-performance.  
In the free-rider control condition participants were given the feedback that they 
achieved about 20% above average after each trial. After the fourth trial in none of the four 
experimental conditions feedback was given, but participants were asked to complete a 
questionnaire, that was functioning as a manipulation check. Participants were then debriefed, 
thanked and paid. 
Results 
The Protestant Work Ethic. In order to disentangle the two aspects of the global 
construct a principal component factor analysis with Varimax-rotation was conducted on the 
data of the questionnaires. A Scree plot indicated the presence of three factors. Seven items 
were loaded on the first factor, all of these items captured the aspect of intrinsic motivation 
(see appendix for details). Thus this factor was called the work-factor, it explained 24,4% of 
the variance. Six items were loaded on the second factor, which explained 7.3 % of the 
variance. All the items captured approval to conservatism and therefore was labeled as 
‘conservatism’. And the third factor with five items loading on it comprised the ‘equity 
items’; it explained 7.0% of the variance.  
Three scales were built on the basis of the structure of the factors, which consisted of 
the items loading high on each of the factor. Cronbach’s Alpha for the ‘work factor’ was  .79, 
for the ‘equity factor’  .80 and for the conservatism factor  .79. The items of each factor are 
depicted in Appendix A.  
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The score on the items of the work-factor was measuring individual differences in the 
attitude towards work. The equity factor was the measure for approval of the equity norm. 
Correlation between the work factor and the equity factor was r = .40, between work and 
conservatism factor r =  .35 and between the equity factor and the conservatism factor r =  .34. 
 Analysis of the Performance Data. Four participants had to be excluded from the 
analysis, one had suspicion about the confederate and the other three did not accomplish the 
task properly. Table 1 reveals the raw-performances in all four conditions for the four trials. 
Raw-performances means the number of all correctly marked signs minus the number of signs 
which were marked falsely and minus the number of signs which had been failed to be 
marked up to the last correctly marked sign. 
The primary dependent variable was the performance in the fourth trial, because when 
participants were performing in the fourth trial the experimental manipulation should have 
been most effective. As depicted in Table 1, scores in the fourth trial in the free-rider 
condition (M = 282.26) and in the sucker-effect condition (M = 279.47) were lower than in 
the free-rider control condition (M = 316.8) and in the control condition sucker-effect (M = 
295.8). A one-way ANCOVA was performed, with the performance in the fourth trial as a 
dependent variable, and the performance on the first trial as a covariate. The first trial was 
used as a covariate in order to control for individual differences in performance before the 
introduction of the experimental manipulations and hence reduce error variance. There was a 
main effect of the condition, F(3, 71) = 3.2, p < .028. Also the effect of the covariate was 
significant, F(1, 71) = 58,7, p < .001. Table 2 contains the mean performances adjusted for the 
covariate. 
Two contrasts were calculated to test for the free-rider effect and the sucker-effect.  
The comparison of the free-rider to the free-rider control was significant, F(1, 67) = 5.67, p < 
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.05.  The comparison of the sucker effect condition to its control revealed a significant sucker-
effect, F(1, 67) = 3.978 , p < .05. 
Analysis of the Performance Data under Consideration of the PWE.   
Participants were divided with a median split on their combined scores from the PWE 
scale from Mirels and Garrett (1971) and the work ethic scale from Ho & Lloyd (1984) into 
participants with a high and low PWE. A 4(free-rider condition versus free-rider control 
condition versus sucker-effect condition versus sucker-effect control condition) X 2(high 
PWE versus low PWE) ANCOVA was performed, using trial 1 as a covariate. The effect of 
the covariate was highly significant, F(1,67) = 57.88, p < .001. The main effect of the 
condition was also significant, F(3,67) = 4.47, p < .006. However the main effect of the PWE 
factor was not significant, F(1, 67) = 2,06, p < .16. The interaction between the conditions and 
the PWE factor was significant, F(3, 67) = 2.68, p = .05. Adjusted means are depicted in 
Table 3, for participants with a high or a low score on the PWE scales separately. Contrasts 
were calculated using these adjusted means. It turned out that participants with a high PWE 
showed no free-rider effect, F(1,67) < 1, n.s.. However, participants with a low PWE showed 
a free-rider effect, F(1,67) = 10.02, p < .005.  Furthermore, the latter group of participants 
showed no sucker-effect, F(1,67) < 1, n.s., whereas participants with a high PWE did exhibit 
the sucker-effect, F(1, 67) = 5.98, p < .01. 
In order to understand these results a bit better, performance-differences of 
participants, who can be distinguished on the scales work and equity, are particularly 
interesting. In order to test for the moderating effects of differences in the attitude towards 
work participants were divided by median split on the work scale. Participants with a high 
score tend to see work as a value itself, whereas participants with a low score are regarded as 
those who see work as means to an end. A 4(free-rider condition versus free-rider control 
condition versus sucker-effect condition versus sucker-effect control condition) X 2(work as a 
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value versus work as a means to an end) ANCOVA was performed, using trial 1 as a 
covariate. The effect of the covariate was highly significant, F(1,67) = 58.76, p < .001. The 
main effect of the condition was also significant, F(3,67) = 2.95, p < .039. However the main 
effect of the work factor was not significant, F(1, 67) = 1, n.s., neither was the interaction 
between the conditions and the work factor, F(3, 67) = 1, n.s.. Adjusted means are depicted in 
Table 4, for participants with a high or a low score on the work scale separately. Contrasts 
were calculated using these adjusted means. It turned out that participants, who value work in 
itself showed no free-rider effect, F(1,67) = 2.33, n.s.. However, participants, who see work as 
a means to an end, showed a free-rider effect, F(1,67) = 3.52 , p < .05.  Furthermore, the latter 
group of participants showed a sucker-effect, F(1,67) = 4.69, p < .05, whereas participants, 
who see work as a value in itself, did not exhibit the sucker-effect, F(1, 67) < 1, n.s..  
A median split on the scores of the equity scale divided participants into two further groups. 
Participants with a high score prefer the equity norm whereas participants with a low score 
prefer the equality norm when asked to divide a reward. A 4(free-rider condition versus free-
rider control condition versus sucker-effect condition versus sucker-effect control condition) 
X 2(endorsing equity versus endorsing equality) ANCOVA was performed, using trial 1 as a 
covariate. Again the effect of the covariate was highly significant, F(1,67) = 61.9, p < .001. 
Also the effect of the different experimental condition was significant, F(3,67) = 3.57, p < 
.019. However the effect of the equity/equality scale was not significant, F(1,67) = 1.41, n.s.. 
Neither was the interaction between the different experimental conditions and the 
equity/equality scale significant, F(3,67) < 1, n.s.. Adjusted means are depicted in Table 5, for 
participants, who value equity, and for participants, who value equality separately. Contrasts 
were calculated using these adjusted means. It turned out that participants, who favor equity, 
showed no free-rider effect, F(1,67) = 2.22, n.s., however participants, who favor equality, did 
exhibit the free-rider effect, F(1,67) = 3.88, p < .05. Moreover, participants, who endorse to 
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the equality norm, did not exhibit the sucker-effect, F(1,67) < 1, n.s., whereas, most 
remarkable, participants, who endorse the equity norm, did show the sucker-effect, F(1,67) = 
5.3, p < .05.  Table 6 summarizes which type of motivation loss was significant for each of 
the participant groups. 
 
Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the effects of individual differences on 
motivation losses in performance groups; more specifically effects of the global construct 
‘PWE’ on the sucker-effect and the free-rider effect were examined.  
Overall, irrespective of individual differences, both a sucker-effect and a free-rider 
effect were obtained. This means that our set-up was successfully designed to elicit these 
well-known motivation losses in group work.  
But let us look now at individual differences. People are alike in some ways, but in 
other ways they are not. The issues of interest at this point is, whether there are people, who 
work equally hard, no matter whether they are working alone or with another/ others, and 
furthermore whether we can systematically distinguish people, who exert equal efforts alone 
and in groups, from people who don’t. 
As we had predicted participants with a high PWE did not show the free-rider effect.  
These participants did not reduce their effort, when knowing that their team-performance was 
well above average and individual contributions were not revealed. They obviously appreciate 
work and therefore exert effort. Looking only at low PWE participants we do observe a free-
rider effect. If their contribution does not appear to be absolutely necessary these kind of 
participants are less inclined to exert effort. 
Concerning the sucker effect and a potential moderating role of the PWE we had two 
competing hypothesis. On the one hand, we speculated that high PWE would not show the 
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sucker effect, as they value work in itself. On the other hand, it could be that high PWE show 
the sucker effect when they would react to the violation of the equity norm in that situation 
rather than the work aspect. It turned out that high PWE showed a sucker-effect. They were 
apparently reacting to the violation of the equity norm in the situation that could provoke a 
motivation loss due to the possibility that someone could free-ride on their effort. Looking 
only at low PWE no sucker effect was observed. These people were not inclined to reduce 
their effort due to the possibility that their team-partner could try to free ride on their effort. 
The findings concerning the PWE and the sucker effect are also consistent with the results of 
Greenberg’s experiment (1978), in which participants with a low PWE (measured with the 
Mirels & Garrett scale (1971)) divided a reward between a partner and themselves according 
to the equality norm and participants with a high PWE applied the equity norm. So not only 
do high PWE place more value on the equity norm than persons with a low PWE in situations 
in which they can alter the reward (Greenberg, 1978), but also if they can just alter their 
individual contribution.  
 With the help of the factor analysis we could separate two components as sufficiently 
different, i.e. the ‘work-component’ and the ‘equity component’. The results of the factor 
analysis are consistent with Furnham (1990b) and Heaven (1989) who concluded that the 
PWE scale consists of several components that correlate only moderately with each other. The 
current study demonstrates empirically that at least two components can be usefully 
distinguished.  Our ‘work-scale’ correlates r = .40 with our ‘equity scale’, the ‘work-scale’ 
correlates . 69 with the PWE-scale from Mirels & Garrett (1971), the ‘equity-scale’ correlates 
.54 with the PWE-scale from Mirels & Garrett (1971). Furthermore the PWE from Ho and 
Lloyd (1984) correlates r = .94 with our ‘work-scale’ and r = .43 with our ‘equity-scale. 
The overall effects of PWE were qualified by examining separately the roles of the 
work and equity components of the scale.  Participants, who value work in itself, did not show 
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the free-rider effect. That means that they were working equally hard on the task, no matter 
whether working alone or working in a group. Knowing that the joint performance was 
considerably above average and that no individual contributions were revealed did not tempt 
these participants to reduce their effort and free-ride on the effort of their partner. Participants, 
who had indicated previously that they value work in itself, worked hard on the task, and 
apparently did not have the primer goal to maximize their individual input output ratio.  
Participants, on the other hand, who see work as a means to an end, did show the free-
rider effect. They exerted less effort when they knew that the joint performance was 
considerably above average and individual contributions were not revealed. In this instance, 
working hard did not have an obvious external goal, and hence these participants apparently 
were more inclined to take advantage of their partner’s contribution, while still benefiting 
from the group product. 
Furthermore, when looking only at the participants, who endorse the equity principle, 
we did not observe a free-rider effect. Participants, who value a proportional input output ratio 
for each team-member, do not reduce their effort when their individual contribution is not 
identifiable and their team’s performance is well above average. Hence, it could well be that 
these people think that the output of attributing the successful completion of the task is not 
proportionally divisible. Consequently they work hard so that equal shares of input can justify 
that the success is equally attributed to both team-members. However, what they cannot 
exclude is the possibility that their contribution exceeded the contribution of their team-
member from the first trial on. 
Participants, who favor the equality principle, do show a free-rider effect. These kind 
of people apparently take a pragmatic approach: If their effort is not seen as necessary for 
collective success, they reduce their effort. Feedback after the first, second and third trial 
might have given them the impression that their partner was working hard and not reducing 
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his effort, and hence their effort was dispensable. For people, who endorse the equality 
principle, an equal distribution of the outcome, without consideration of inputs, is perceived 
as fair. Consequently, they might see no need to keep up their effort, neither for successful 
task completion nor for, in their own eyes, as fair perceived behavior. 
As predicted, participants, who place high value on the equity norm showed the 
sucker-effect, whereas participants who prefer the equality norm did not. This implies that the 
former would find a violation of the equity norm so aversive that they rather accept a poor 
team performance and sacrifice a part of their individual reward than be treated unfairly by an 
equity rule. For the participants, who endorse the equality norm, a comparison of the own 
cost-benefit ratio with the cost-benefit ratio of the team-partner seems to be irrelevant. It is 
not that aversive to them if they get the impression that their team-member is not working as 
hard as he could. It is probably not a situation they hope for, but it does not seem that 
significant to them on an emotional level. Similarly as the equality endorsers are inclined to 
take advantage if there is an opportunity to free-ride, probably without feeling too bad about it 
either. It seems that these kind of people just have a pragmatic approach to team-work, it 
appears that the maximization of their individual input output ratio is most salient to them. 
Equity endorsers, on the other hand, seem to be very sensitive to the behavior of other team-
members in a social way. Most salient to them seems to be their individual input output ratio 
in comparison to the input output ratio of other team-members. They do not take advantage to 
free-ride, but they reduce their effort when they get the feeling that somebody else wants to 
free-ride on their effort. This means that their behavior cannot be explained rationally, in 
terms of utility maximization. In line with this reasoning, it is interesting to note that, 
participants who prefer the equity norm show the highest performance among all participant-
groups in the sucker-effect control condition. This emphasizes again that their decisive aspect 
of the input is not the measurable contribution, but the effort. When working with an unable 
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partner they might feel obliged to devote their ability even more, in order to achieve the 
desired outcome. 
These results also speak well for the validity of the added ‘equity items’ as 
participants who showed the sucker-effect and participants who did not show the sucker-
effect can be distinguished by their scores on these items.  
Let us look at these partial results on a different level. What do these results imply, if 
you want to organize a successful teamwork? Imagine you had to choose people to work 
together, and you wanted them to be successful as a team. Would you choose people, who 
endorse more to equity or more to equality? In the light of the current results, it seems that 
you should choose equity endorsers to avoid the free-rider effect. You would be also well off 
with only equity endorsers to avoid the sucker-effect, given that none of them would be 
inclined to free-ride on another’s effort. However, imagine that there would be the 
information that one team member was not exerting enough effort; this can also be a false 
information, like wrongly interpreted behavior. Equity endorsers would be inclined to react to 
that information in a quite disruptive way for the team, while equality endorsers would be less 
likely affected by this information, and therefore, in this instance, more beneficial for the 
team. Given that interpretation of behavior, be it effort driven or capability driven, is not 
always accurate, it makes sense to also have people on a team, who are less responsive to 
other’s apparent motives for performance, but rather to the performance itself and the 
situational requirements. 
Results of participants who can be distinguished in their attitude towards work are 
interesting concerning the sucker-effect condition. Participants who see work as a value itself 
do not show the sucker-effect. Apparently when these kind of people work they are not 
affected by external factors, like unequal cost-benefit ratios among the group members. They 
indicate that work in itself is a value for them, they want to work and perform well, they do 
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not want to take advantage of an opportunity to free-ride, neither are they affected when 
somebody else free-rides on their effort. This could mean that they either accept 
psychological costs as they are intrinsically motivated, or having somebody potentially free-
ride on their effort is not perceived as a psychological cost for people, who value work in 
itself. 
Participants who see work as a means to an end show the sucker-effect. Getting the 
information that their team-partner is apparently exerting less effort on the task, makes them 
reduce their effort, too.  It could be that for people who see work as a means to an end, the 
relevant aspect in this situation is not that somebody could free ride on their effort, but rather 
that somebody else reduces their effort. Maybe that is the sign for them to reduce their effort, 
too. It could be that they interpret this information as diagnostic in terms of whether it is 
worth to work hard on this task. Any cue that the task might not be worth to work on hard, 
might be taken as a reason to reduce their own effort. It could, however, also be that they see 
their reward in relative terms. They indicate they see work as a means to an end. So the “end” 
might not be something absolute and fixed but maybe relative and even social, and the frame 
of reference could consist of the cost-benefit ratios of other group-member.  
Summing up the results on individual differences in performances deterioration in 
teamwork, it seems that when composing a team, one is best of with people, who see work as 
a value. They did not show any of the two motivation losses we tested for, neither the free-
rider effect, nor the sucker effect. However, one should make sure that the “work-endorsers” 
one chooses are not at the same time, high equity endorsers. For, as we have shown that the 
latter seem to be particular sensitive to the behavior of others.  
The results imply that you should not choose people for a team, who see work as a 
means to an end. This is because their individual utility seems to be most salient to them. 
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Teamwork situations provide possibilities in which individuals can maximize their individual 
input output ratio, which are not beneficial for the team. 
If you want to avoid the sucker effect, it is good to have equality endorsers in the 
team. But these people would be inclined to free-ride. Hence, concerning beliefs in an equity 
principle, there is no easy answer about whom to choose best for a team. Equality endorsers 
could be inclined to free-ride, but equity endorsers can react sensitive and disruptive for the 
group when they get the feeling that somebody else could free-ride on their effort. Hence, the 
best way to get a well-performing team would be to compose it of people who value work in 
itself. At the same time design the teamwork situation as such that threatening issues about 
equity and reward distribution have little chance to come up. 
 
Conclusions 
Overall results replicated the well-known motivation losses in group work. But the 
findings are reassuring when we are looking for a good team-partner. We just need to choose 
the right one. The PWE moderates motivation losses in group work in an interesting way. 
High PWE showed no free-rider effect but the sucker effect, and vice versa. Decomposing the 
PWE in the work and the equity factor helped to explain this result. Seeing work as a value 
was related to no motivation loss, while seeing work as a means to an end was related to both.  
Preference for equity principle was related to the sucker effect, while preference for the 
equality principle was related to the free-rider effect. Hence, the findings strengthen the claim 
to measure the global construct ‘PWE’ not with one unique measure, as the experimental 
results confirm that different components of the PWE are associated with different behavior 
patterns. Furthermore we could show that motivation-losses in group-work can be moderated 
by individual differences. That is that the attitude towards work and the attitude towards 
reward distributions have an impact on how individuals work in a group. 
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Appendix A 
Items loading on the first factor (‘work factor’): 
1. Hard work is not a key to success. (Ho, 1984) 
2. People who work deserve success. (Ho, 1984) 
3. There are few satisfactions equal to the realisation that one has done one’s best at a job 
(Mirels & Garrett, 1971). 
4. By working hard an individual can overcome most obstacles that life presents and make his 
or her own way in the world. (Ho, 1984) 
5. Nothing is impossible if you work hard enough. (Ho, 1984) 
6. If you work hard you will succeed (Ho, 1984) 
7. The person who can approach an unpleasant task with enthusiasm is the one who gets 
ahead. (Mirels & Garrett, 1971) 
 
Items on the second factor (‘conservatism factor’): 
1. People should have more leisure time to spend in relaxation (r)1. (Mirels & Garrett, 1971) 
2. Life would be more meaningful if we had more leisure time (r). (Mirels & Garrett, 1971) 
3. Our society would have fewer problems if people had less leisure time. (Mirels & Garrett, 
1971). 
4. Most people who don’t succeed in life are just plain lazy. (Mirels & Garrett, 1971) 
5. Most people spend too much time in unprofitable amusement. (Mirels & Garrett, 1971) 
6. A self-made person is likely to be more ethical than a person born to wealth. (Mirels & 
Garrett, 1971) 
 
Items loading on the third factor (‘equity factor’): 
                                                           
1 (r) means that the scoring of the item is reversed. 
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1. When a task is completed by a team there is nothing wrong with distributing the reward 
equally regardless of unequal input (r). 
2. The relative input of each team-member does not necessarily provide a legitimate basis for 
claiming differential rewards (r). 
3 Rewards should be distributed to persons in direct proportion to their inputs (i.e., their 
relative contributions).  
4. The trouble with giving people equal rewards for work is that they very rarely work equally 
hard. 
5. If people work together on a task it is very important that the reward is distributed in 
proportion to the effort each puts in. 
 
The Protestant Work Ethic and Group Performance 
 
32
Table 1:  Number of Signs Participants Managed to Work on in the Different Conditions 
 Condition 1 
free-rider effect
Condition 2 
control 
free-rider effect 
Condition 3 
sucker-effect 
Condition 4 
control 
sucker-effect 
1. Trial1           
                       
107.58  
(17.52) 
115.2 
(12.53) 
106.41 
(17.69) 
104.5 
(18.78) 
2. Trial            
                       
273.79 
(32.69) 
287.75 
(31.18) 
271.24 
(43.16) 
259.55 
(39.99) 
3. Trial            
                       
280.89 
(35.35) 
301.95 
(30.07) 
276.41 
(39.38) 
279.55 
(41.42) 
4. Trial            
                      
282.26 
(40.14) 
316.8 
(32.58) 
279.47 
(43.53) 
295.8 
(41.58) 
1 Please note that the first trial lasted for one minute only, while the others lasted for 2,5 
minutes. 
Table entries are means with standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
 
 
Table 2:  Adjusted Means in 4. Trial  
 Condition 1 
free-rider effect
Condition 2 
control 
free-rider effect 
Condition 3 
sucker-effect 
Condition 4 
control 
sucker-effect 
4. Trial            
                      
283.74 
(6.75) 
306.19 
(6.72) 
282.81 
(7.15) 
302.17 
(6.63) 
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Table 3: Adjusted Means in Trial 4 for participants with a high and low PWE 
 Condition 1 
free-rider effect
Condition 2  
control 
free-rider effect
Condition 3 
sucker-effect 
Condition 4 
control 
sucker-effect 
High PWE 
                            
                       
299.58 
(8.49) 
309.18 
(9.02) 
271.98 
(11.56) 
308.24 
(9.39) 
Low PWE           
                      
261.83 
(9.97) 
304.1 
(8.98) 
288.49 
(8.49) 
296.71 
(8.58) 
 
 
 
Table 4: Adjusted Means in Trial 4 for participants, who value work, and for participants, 
who see work as a means to an end 
 
 Condition 1 
free-rider effect
Condition 2  
control 
free-rider effect
Condition 3 
sucker-effect 
Condition 4 
control 
sucker-effect 
work as a value 
                            
                       
292.56 
(9.35) 
312.18 
(9.05) 
287.19 
(11.13) 
295.64 
(9.86) 
work as a means 
to an end                
                      
273.98 
(9.83) 
298.66 
(9.85) 
279.78 
(9.31) 
307.6 
(8.9) 
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Table 5: Adjusted Means in Trial 4 for participants, who endorse to the equity norm, and for 
participants, who endorse to the equality norm 
 Condition 1 
free-rider effect
Condition 2  
control 
free-rider effect
Condition 3 
sucker-effect 
Condition 4 
control 
sucker-effect 
equality 
                            
                       
272.89 
(10.35) 
300.26 
(9.45) 
286.76 
(8.47) 
294.18 
(9.3) 
equity            
                      
291.8 
(8.84) 
310.86 
(9.31) 
274.0 
(13.1) 
310.9 
(9.61) 
 
Table 6: Summary of significant free-rider and sucker effects for each of the participant 
groups 
         free-rider effect         sucker-effect 
 
High PWE 
 
Low PWE 
 
work as a value 
                               
 
        F(1,67) < 1, n.s. 
 
        F(1,67) = 10, p< .005 
 
        F(1,67) = 2.33, n.s. 
 
 
      F(1,67) = 5.98, p < .01 
 
      F(1,67)< 1, n.s. 
 
      F(1,67)< 1, n.s. 
           
work as a means 
to an end  
 
equality 
 
equity   
                  
         
        F(1,67) = 3.52, p < .05 
 
        F(1,67) = 3.88, p < .05 
 
        F(1,67) = 2.22 n.s. 
       
      F(1,67) = 4.69, p < .05 
 
      F(1,67) < 1, n.s. 
 
      F(1,67) = 5.3, p < .05 
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